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ABSTRACT
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Under the Supervision of Professor Michael Liston

Suppose 92 coins, flipped in succession, all come up heads. If we were previously
confident that the process was fair, we would be surprised at this outcome. What, if anything,
explains our surprise? And is it warranted? In what follows I do two things. First, I propose and
defend an explanation of our surprise: we are surprised at the 92-head sequence, and various
other sequences, because they are patterned. Second, Martin Smith (2017) has argued that, on
an initial assumption that the coin-flipping process is fair, an observation of 92 heads does not
warrant surprise. Against Smith, I argue that even if we knew beforehand that the coin-flipping
process is fair, our knowledge is defeated by an observation of 92 heads. Under reasonable
constraints on the prior probability that our initial assumption of fairness was wrong, an
observation of 92 heads (or various other patterned outcomes) makes us practically certain
that the process is unfair. As such, an observation of 92 heads does warrant surprise.
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1

Introduction

This thesis explores the following puzzle. Suppose 92 coins, flipped in succession, all come up
heads.1 Let’s stipulate that before the coins were flipped, we were confident that the process
was fair: the coins weren’t trick coins, the flips were independent, there were no hidden
magnets, or anything. In fact, for our purposes, we might even suppose that the process was
indeed fair in this way, and that we knew this beforehand. In such circumstances, we would likely
be surprised at an outcome of 92 heads. This raises two questions. First, why would we be
surprised? More precisely, is there an informative explanation of our surprise — one that, for
instance, would be nontrivial and non-circular, and would also explain our surprise at certain
other outcomes (say, the sequence HTHTHTHT… of alternating heads and tails), as well as our
lack of surprise at other outcomes (say, some apparently arbitrary sequence beginning
HTTHTHHT…)? And second, considering outcomes at which we would be surprised, such as 92
heads, would our surprise be warranted?2
In “Why Throwing 92 Heads in a Row Is Not Surprising” (2017), Martin Smith argues that
there is no good explanation for our surprise, and that “we shouldn’t feel surprised, that we have
no reason to feel surprised and, if we do feel surprised, then we’re being irrational” (p. 2).3 I think
this is a mistake. In what follows I’ll try to argue as much, by proposing an explanation for our
surprise that shows it to be warranted.

1

Two details are salient here: first, that the number of coin flips is 92; second, that 92 coins are flipped once each,
rather than one coin 92 times each. I have left it open who is flipping the coins, or how they are being flipped, for
two reasons. First, these are the terms in which Smith discusses the puzzle. (The initial case which provides the
motivation for his account is more concrete, but the additional details do not feature prominently in his discussion.)
Second, although the particular details of each case will affect the specific conclusions we are entitled to draw, I
want to articulate a sufficiently context-general framework for thinking about cases of this type.
2
I will use the terms “warranted” and “justified” (and their respective cognates) interchangeably.
3
All undated page number references will be to this paper.
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It will be useful to begin by briefly discussing some of the conceptual structure of surprise,
focusing on its relationship to warrant. We’ll do that in chapter 2 below. Then, in chapter 3, we’ll
examine two criteria Smith proposes to explain our surprise, and show why they don’t work. In
chapter 4 I’ll give a suggestion of my own: we are surprised at highly patterned sequences. In
chapter 5, I’ll argue that the presence of pattern not only explains, but warrants our surprise: we
are surprised at patterned sequences because they are unlikely to have been produced by 92 fair
coin flips. Finally, in chapter 6, I will explore the prospects for extending the insights gained from
this puzzle to a more general theory of surprise.

2

2

The nature of surprise

I’ll try to clarify some of the conceptual structure of surprise in this chapter, focusing primarily
on its relationship to warrant. Three points will be crucial: (1) responses of surprise are subject to
warrant, (2) surprise itself serves as a warrant for action, and (3) whether or not surprise is
warranted depends on the initial conditions in which it arises.

2.1

Warrant

Although all sorts of things might elicit surprise, not all of them warrant surprise. For instance, if
you are surprised by something you should have been expecting, your surprise is unwarranted.
Depending on context, expressions of the form “X is surprising” can mean either of two things:
that X merely elicits surprise, or that X warrants surprise. In what follows, I will only say that X is
surprising to convey the second sense, and I’ll say X elicits surprise to convey the first sense.

2.2

Surprise as warrant for action

Besides the fact that circumstances serve as a warrant for surprise, Smith notes (and I agree)
that surprise itself serves as a warrant for action (p. 6). If X surprises us, it strikes us as somehow
abnormal and/or in conflict with our prior beliefs or expectations, driving us to inquire into an
explanation of X and/or to revise those beliefs or expectations.4 As such, for surprise to be

4

In classifying belief revision among the “actions” warranted in the face of warranted surprise, I’m not endorsing
doxastic voluntarism. Rather, I’m appealing to the idea that belief formation, maintenance and revision are rational
responses to evidence, and hence expressions of agency or rational activity in a certain (we might say Kantian) sense,
although this is, as Matthew Boyle puts it, “a notion of rational activity […] broader than the notion of voluntary
rational action” (2011, 144). We speak of people changing their minds, or refusing to do so. By contrast, falling is a
mere causal effect of losing one’s footing, certainly not a rational response, and not the sort of thing that can be
warranted. Anyway, the main point is that belief revision is amenable to warrant. Whether or not one wants to call
it an action, as I do, is secondary.
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warranted, these actions must also be warranted, including whatever inquiry we might pursue
into an explanation of X. Given this connection between surprise and inquiry, it’s worth asking
the following question: is the warrant for surprise settled at the beginning of inquiry, or does it
depend partly on its results?

2.3

Warrant for surprise is determined in initial circumstances

Here Smith and I disagree. I claim the warrant for surprise is settled at the beginning of inquiry.
In particular, surprise at X can be warranted if it is initially plausible to inquire into an explanation
of X, even if such inquiry concludes that nothing was out of the ordinary after all. We can say, for
instance: “Surprising event X occurred, but it turned out to be a coincidence.” The fact that it
turned out to be a coincidence upon inquiry doesn’t make our initial surprise any less warranted.
Smith takes the opposite view. He suggests that if, upon investigation, the process is found
to have been fair, then there’s nothing surprising about the outcome.5 I simply note this
difference here, but will return to it in chapter 5 below.

5

In making this suggestion, he runs together whether or not an event initially seems to require (and ultimately has)
an explanation and whether or not it’s surprising. In general, explanation-worthiness and surprise aren’t equivalent,
but for the purposes of the coin-flipping scenario in this paper we can assume they are.

4

3

Two bad criteria

Having clarified some of the conceptual structure of surprise in the previous chapter, let’s move
on to determining what might explain our surprise. An initial difficulty is that two apparently
plausible criteria for explaining our surprise don’t in fact explain it. This makes it easy to believe
that there isn’t any plausible explanation for our surprise, and consequently that it can’t be
justified. We’ll see in chapter 4 that there are plausible criteria, but let’s get the misleading ones
out of the way first.

3.1

Mere unlikelihood

Smith offers a first suggestion for why we might be surprised at 92 heads: “it’s very unlikely for
someone to throw 92 heads in a row. And if something very unlikely happens, then that’s got to
be surprising, [hasn’t] it?” (p. 3) That is,
(C1)

A sequence elicits surprise just in case it is unlikely.

As Smith rightly points out, however, the 92-head sequence is as unlikely an outcome of 92 fair
coin flips as some sequence HTTHHTHT…, say. Either sequence, or any other, will appear with
probability 1 in 292, or about 2 in 1028. If this is what explains our surprise, argues Smith, then our
surprise is unwarranted, because if this improbability warranted surprise, then every outcome
would warrant surprise — an absurd conclusion.
Although one certainly wants to say that unlikelihood is a necessary condition for
warranted surprise, I agree with Smith that the unlikelihood of any individual sequence, in this
sense, is insufficient: it wouldn’t warrant surprise all by itself. But unlikelihood in this sense
doesn’t in fact explain our surprise, anyway. If we are initially confident that the process is fair,

5

we won’t in fact be surprised at every outcome.6 So let’s have a second attempt at explaining
what elicits our surprise.

3.2

Zero subjective probability

Some basic probability theory will be useful to illustrate the second proposal. My exposition
follows Smith’s (pp. 4-5). Flipping 92 coins in succession is an instance of a random process, with
various potential outcomes (here, sequences of heads and/or tails of length 92). The set of all
possible outcomes (here, all such sequences) is the sample space. Now, typically, in thinking
about the probability of obtaining 92 heads, we wouldn’t just compare the 92-head sequence
with other individual sequences. Rather, we’d divide up the sample space by number of heads
and consider the probability of obtaining each possible value from 0 to 92 — in the language of
probability theory, we’d take the distribution of the random variable [number of heads] on the
sample space7 — resulting in what’s called a binomial distribution:

6

To be sure, someone might still attempt to explain his surprise at 92 heads by saying something like, “What are
the chances of that?” Now, if what he means is, “What are the chances of a fair process yielding 92 heads, rather
than some other outcome?” then he is simply mistaken about what actually elicits his surprise, because he would not
respond in the same way to all the other, equally unlikely outcomes. However — to foreshadow chapter 5 — he
might instead mean something like, “What are the chances of a fair process, rather than an unfair process, yielding
92 heads?” And, under reasonable prior assumptions concerning the relative likelihood of various generating
processes, he would be right, and moreover his surprise would be warranted precisely on that basis.
7
For our purposes, a random variable is a function that assigns each outcome a unique value, such that the set of
outcomes with a given value, or collection of values, has a well-defined probability. Here, the possible values of our
random variable [number of heads] are the integers 0 through 92. A random variable yields a partition of the sample
space, but note that multiple random variables can correspond to the same partition; we might then say the random
variables in question are equivalent. For instance, the random variables [number of tails] is equivalent to [number
of heads]: if you know the number of heads of a given sequence, you can immediately determine the number of
tails, and vice versa.
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Figure 1. Probability of obtaining a given number of heads
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As the figure indicates, the distribution has a peak at the value 46, which has a probability mass
of about 0.083. By contrast, the values 0 and 92 lie at the extreme tails of the distribution — the
extreme ends of the graph, where it “tapers off”8 — and have the lowest possible probability
masses of about 2 in 1028. Beyond about 63 heads, the probabilities are too low to register
properly on the graph, but the figure consequently doesn’t do justice to how sharply the
probabilities drop as the number of heads increases. To illustrate: near the centre of the
distribution, you’re about one-ninth as likely to observe 56 heads as to observe 46. But out in the
right tail, the probability of observing 86 heads is one in one billion the probability of observing
76. More generally, for any number of heads n greater than 46 and any additional number of
heads k, the probability of observing n + k heads becomes a much smaller fraction of the
probability of observing n heads as n increases.

8

The word “tail” Is liable to cause confusion: it may refer either to the side of a coin opposite heads, or to the
extreme end of a distribution, where it tapers off. I’ll try my best to make it clear which sense is at play, but both
senses will be essential to my argument, so using it in both senses is unavoidable. For instance, as we’ll see in
chapter 4, an important feature of certain surprise-eliciting sequences isn’t just that their values in some distribution
are relatively unlikely, but that they’re relatively unlikely and at the extreme ends of the distribution — that is, in
the tails.

7

In short, although each individual sequence of coin flips is equally probable, when we divide the
sample space up by number of heads, 92 is far less likely to appear than the other values. It may
consequently be tempting only to entertain the possibility that values around 46 heads will
appear — i.e., simply to rule out an outcome of 92 heads (pp. 4-5). And if we have ruled out the
possibility, its appearance will elicit surprise. Hence Smith’s second suggestion:
(C2)

A sequence elicits surprise just in case we have ruled out its possibility prior to
observing it.

Now, in the statistical sense, the expected number of heads (i.e., the probability-weighted
average) is 46, and the bulk of the distribution is around 46. But just because some range of
values is closer to the “expected value” (in the statistical sense), argues Smith, doesn’t mean we
should expect (in the everyday sense) to observe values inside that range.9 As he puts it,
there is one sense in which we should “expect” to get around 46 heads — we should
regard this as highly likely, or assign it a high probability. The set of sequences in which
we have around 46 heads covers a large proportion of the total set of outcomes. But
there’s another sense in which we shouldn’t “expect” to get around 46 heads — we
shouldn’t believe that this is going to happen. We shouldn’t believe that the sequences
outside the set won’t come up, while keeping an open mind about the sequences inside
the set. There are no grounds for this — the sequences are all on a par. (5)

It is true that if we’ve ruled out an outcome, then its appearance would elicit surprise: in other
words, ruling out an outcome is sufficient for surprise. Moreover, I agree with that we shouldn’t
rule out an outcome of 92 heads, if we assume that the process is fair. If this were what explained
our surprise, it would indeed be unwarranted. But, again, I don’t think this does explain our
surprise. Smith identifies “expecting around 46 heads” (in the everyday sense) with ruling out

9

Sometimes we cannot expect (in the everyday sense) to observe the expected value (in the probabilistic sense).
The distribution of the number of children people in a large room happened to have might yield an expected value
of 2.4, but it’d be patently absurd to expect that anyone have 2.4 children.
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values significantly far from 46, but this identification is too strong.10 If we are judging based on
the distribution of number of heads, or an intuitive understanding of it, to say we “expect around
46 heads” isn’t to say we rule out the possibility of 92 heads, assigning it zero probability of
appearing. Rather, we deem it highly unlikely relative to the alternatives.11
So Smith’s second proposal for explaining our surprise is no good, and gives us no headway
concerning whether or not our surprise is warranted.

3.3

Modifying the second suggestion

But perhaps this proposal was on the right track, and simply needs modifying to correct the
false assumption that we rule out certain sequences, as follows:
(C2')

A sequence surprises us just in case it corresponds to a relatively unlikely value of
some random variable on the sample space.

10

Why might Smith have characterized the proposal in this way? Perhaps because, having dismissed the proposal
that certain sequences are surprising in virtue of showing up with low probability, he thinks any other proposal must
involve expecting certain sequences to show up with zero probability. But remember, Smith only dismissed the lowprobability proposal because, given that every individual sequence is equally improbable, none is relatively
improbable. When we consider sequences by number of heads, though, some values are less probable relative to
the others. The individual sequences remain equally improbable, of course, but at this point in the argument we’re
explicitly setting aside individual (or absolute) probabilities in favour of probabilities with respect to the distribution
of [number of heads].
11
There’s an interesting question here: given that 92 heads could show up, albeit with low probability, should we be
able to say that we believe it won’t show up? What’s at issue here is the relationship between beliefs and credences.
Some people identify belief that X with credence 1, and belief that not-X with credence 0. Others take it that belief
and non-belief kick in at some threshold value of credence, while yet others advocate that beliefs are superfluous
and credences are all we need. We won’t settle the issue here, but it seems like there is a sense in which we are
justified in believing that 92 heads won’t happen: the probability is so low that for all practical purposes we can write
the possibility off. For instance, the probability of getting 92 heads is far lower than that of two people, selecting a
random grain of sand on the surface of the earth, will choose the same one. And if it seems reasonable to say
outright that two people won’t choose the same grain of sand, even though it’s possible, it’s not clear why we
shouldn’t be able to say outright that 92 heads won’t show up.
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Now, in response to C2’, Smith argues that if our surprise partly depends on a choice of random
variable, it cannot be warranted (p. 5).12 If we partition the sample space up by number of heads,
then some values are less likely than others, and outcomes with relatively unlikely values might
therefore seem to warrant surprise. But if the sequences are all individually “on a par” in their
individual probability, why should we partition the sample space by number of heads and judge
surprisingness on that basis? A different partition might well yield the opposite result.
For instance, take some class of outcomes C which makes up most of the total probability
and includes the sequence with 92 heads. C might be, say, the set of all sequences which do not
have equally many heads and tails. But it could also be a wildly gerrymandered collection which
simply happened to contain most of the possible sequences, including the one with 92 heads,
but left out some sequences with 46 heads. Having partitioned the sample space into outcomes
in C and outcomes outside C, if we wanted to continue to defend our surprise, it looks like we’d
have to say one of two things. We might maintain that the sequence with 92 heads is surprising,
but that some more “arbitrary”-seeming sequence which falls in C is not. But then, it seems, we’d
be admitting that whether or not a sequence is surprising doesn’t depend on how we divide up
the sample space. Or we might say that surprise is contingent on a partition of the sample space,
and that in this case a sequence with equally many heads and tails is surprising, because it falls
outside C, but the one with 92 heads is not — surely a disastrous result!
So, it seems, this candidate criterion also falls by the wayside.

12

But I’ve tried to separate this (forceful) challenge from his (false) assumption that our surprise comes from having
ruled out certain outcomes.

10

4 A better criterion: surprise as noticing pattern
We’ve been trying to figure out which sequences of coin flips elicit our surprise. So far, the best
we’ve managed to do is find one criterion that seems relevant: some outcomes correspond to
relatively unlikely values of some random variable — for instance, 92 is a relatively unlikely value
of the random variable [number of heads]. But Smith presented the following challenge:
whichever way you slice up the sample space, each individual sequence is still an equally likely
outcome of 92 fair coin flips. So, even if a choice of random variable partly explains our surprise
at some sequences and not others, no such choice could possibly warrant surprise at some
outcomes and not others.
In this chapter, we’ll identify a criterion that does escape Smith’s challenge. Our ultimate
result will be that we are surprised by sequences when we notice pattern in them. Then in chapter
5 we’ll see why patterned sequences warrant surprise.

4.1

Evaluating random processes
To begin, it’s worth asking: can we define a criterion for surprise at certain sequences

without reference to some random variable on the sample space? The answer is “only with great
difficulty.” There’s very little at all we can say about the sample space without reference to some
random variable on it. Even Smith’s decision to consider each outcome separately amounts to a
choice of random variable on the sample space. That is to say, it isn’t obvious that the only
probabilities we should be concerned with are the probabilities of each individual sequence

11

resulting from a series of fair coin flips.13 A more productive question would be: which random
variables on the space should we consider, and why?
Unfortunately, this question has no general, precise answer. But to make some headway,
it helps to reconsider the more abstract perspective we’ve been taking so far. Although, from a
purely mathematical point of view, we can define all sorts of random variables on our sample
space, the coin-flipping process is not itself an abstract mathematical object, a mere set of
strings of length 92 consisting of Hs and Ts. Rather, it is a concrete process, involving various
agents and physical conditions. Attending to the real intentional and physical features involved
in the process helps us determine what random variables will be relevant.
In essence, we want random variables which track meaningful properties of the coinflipping process and its outcomes, and which are informative for picking out those outcomes that
elicit our surprise.14 An arbitrarily gerrymandered partition of the sample space doesn’t track any
meaningful properties: it doesn’t tell us anything about the sequences that fall into a given set
in the partition, because all they have in common just is belonging to that set. Other random
variables track meaningful properties, but aren’t informative regarding which sequences elicit or

13

In fact, there is an even more radical worry in the vicinity. Random variables are defined relative to the sample
space, but even our choice of sample space (i.e of what counts as an individual outcome of the coin-flipping
process) might have been different. For instance, instead of individuating outcomes solely by the resulting
sequence of heads and tails, we might have individuated outcomes according to the resulting sequence of heads or
tails, and which hand produced each flip, or which surface each coin landed on. Of course, this would make it much
harder to assign a probability to the individual outcomes. But these other ways of individuating outcomes could
certainly be relevant for explaining our surprise. For instance, we might discover that the coin only lands heads
consistently when it lands on the table, which might lead us to hypothesise that the table is magnetic. (Thanks to
Kevin Dorst for raising this worry about outcome individuation.)
14
It may help some readers here to recall David Lewis’ (1983) notion of a “natural property”; just as the property
green “carves nature at the joints” better than grue, one might say the random variable [number of heads] carves
up the sample space more meaningfully than some arbitrary gerrymandering of the space. However, I do not claim
that some properties are objectively more meaningful, or informative, than others. Rather, I think meaningfulness
varies with context. In the case of coin-flipping, a property such as the number of heads is relevant to salient physical
properties of the process (such as whether or not the coin is biased). Other properties may not be as relevant in this
context, but may become relevant in other contexts.
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might warrant surprise. For instance, we might well divide the sample space into sequences with
more than ten heads and sequences with ten or fewer: this is a meaningful random variable. But
we aren’t surprised at a sequence of 92 heads because it has more than ten heads (even though
it does). And so, with regard to the question of surprise at 92 heads, this random variable isn’t
informative: pointing out that the class of sequences with more than ten heads contains most of
the probability mass and includes the sequence with 92 heads is neither here nor there.15
In virtue of what properties, then, might we be surprised at a sequence of 92 heads? A
few plausible candidates: we might be surprised that the sequence displays so many heads, or
so many more of one face than the other, or such a long run of heads (or of one face), or so few
(i.e. zero) switches between faces, etc. In each case three conditions hold:
(1) there is a property which admits of degrees,
(2) sequences possessing the property to an extreme degree are less common,
(3) the sequence of 92 heads is one of those sequences.
In probabilistic terms, if we consider the random variables (1) [number of heads], (2) [difference
between number of heads and number of tails], (3) [longest run of heads], (4) [number of
switches between faces], the 92-head sequence falls into a tail of each resulting distribution.
This suggests the following, more general criterion:
(C3)

A sequence elicits surprise relative to some degreed property just in case there is a
random variable tracking the relevant property, and the sequence in question falls
into a tail of the resulting distribution.

15

Of course, we would be surprised at a sequence with ten heads or fewer. (That said, the binary random variable
[ten or fewer heads/more than ten heads] is rather coarse-grained.
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This criterion picks out quite a few sequences which indeed elicit surprise. Given an appropriate
choice of random variable, this criterion predicts, not only that 92 heads will surprise us, but also
that the following other sequences will: any sequences with a large imbalance of one face over
the other; any sequence in which successive faces switch very frequently or very infrequently;
any sequence in which a very long run of one face shows up, etc.16 But it doesn’t give us the full
story, for the following reasons.
(1) It undergenerates surprise-eliciting sequences. For instance, we’d be quite surprised to
notice that a sequence of apparently fair coin flips corresponded to the first 92 bits of ,
but it’s hard to think of a random variable that could possibly help explain why.
(2) Even if the criterion were extensionally adequate, we aren’t surprised by certain
outcomes because we take them to fall into a tail of such-and-such a distribution. We
don’t need to know probability theory to be surprised. In fact, for a given property, we
might not even be aware that fewer sequences possess that property to an extreme
degree; our judgments may simply happen in fact to line up with this criterion.
(3) It remains vulnerable to Smith’s challenge, because it’s relative to a choice of random
variable. If you were unimpressed by my contention that appeal to some choice of
random variable is well-nigh unavoidable, you might think this criterion might explain
our surprise, but couldn’t conceivably warrant surprise. So I should find the criterion less
than ideal if my aim is ultimately to argue that our surprise is warranted. In any case,
some sequences — for instance, 92 heads — seem to come out as less likely relative to

16

Considering a wider range of random variables beyond [number of heads] helps us to pin down some surpriseeliciting sequences that we might otherwise have missed. The sequence HTHTHTHT…, for instance, has 46 heads,
falling right into the peak of the distribution [number of heads], and yet it surprises us. But it does fall into a tail of
the distribution of [number of switches between faces].

14

multiple choices of random variable, suggesting that there is some more general, intrinsic
characterisation of those sequences in virtue of which this is the case.
And indeed, I want to suggest, there is such a characterisation.

4.2

Surprise as noticing patterns

What surprises us about the 92-head sequence, I want to propose in this section, is that it
exhibits a high degree of pattern. What I mean by “pattern” lines up with our ordinary notion: we
might say some sequence of coin flips displays a pattern of constantly (or disproportionately)
landing heads, maybe, or of two heads regularly following a tail. But a more precise, technical
definition will be useful in what follows: a sequence is patterned if it is compressible, if, without
losing information, we can specify it in shorter terms than spelling out each individual flip (“92
heads” or “‘H’*92” instead of “HHHHHHHH…”, say).17 Inversely, a sequence is random if there
is no efficient way to specify it short of spelling it out. And there are grades of randomness in
between; the shorter the minimum possible description length, the more patterned the
sequence. The minimum possible description length of such a sequence, considered as a binary
string, is also called the algorithmic complexity or Kolmogorov complexity of the string.
Hence, we have our fourth criterion:
(C4)

A sequence elicits surprise just in case it exhibits a high degree of pattern.
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The various insights into characterising pattern employed in this paper, including this definition of pattern, are
deliverances of the subfield of theoretical computer science known as algorithmic information theory, or AIT. For a
paper which doubles as a friendly philosophical introduction to AIT and a demonstration of its considerable
theoretical utility, see Daniel Dennett’s classic “Real Patterns” (1994), from which readers may recognise the
definition; see also Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized by James Ladyman and Don Ross, with David
Spurrett and John Collier (2010), especially chapter 4. For a more traditional introduction see Cover and Thomas
(1991), chapter 7, or Grünwald and Vitányi (2008). The standard reference is Li and Vitányi (2019).
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It can be proven, for many random variables, that any sequence located in a tail of the probability
distribution over one of those random variables has a short minimum description length. So this
criterion encompasses our initial suggestion above.18 But it also captures other surprise-eliciting
sequences that our previous proposed criteria might not have captured easily: consider the
sequence corresponding to the first 92 bits of , say, or the sequence consisting of “HHTT” 23
times. Moreover, we can define the algorithmic complexity of a sequence independently of any
random variable, and even independently of assigning probability values to individual
sequences, so Smith’s challenge to the previous criteria doesn’t apply to this one. But it does
come with a slight caveat: we have to notice the patterns in question. If we don’t recognise the
bits of , for instance, the sequence might not surprise us, but were we to recognise the pattern,
we should find it extraordinary that an ostensibly random sequence of coin flips happened to
spell it out.
So that’s my suggestion: what elicits our surprise at a given sequence is a noticeable pattern.
But why might patterns warrant surprise? That is the subject of the next chapter.

18

Here’s a sketch of the idea: if, say, the sequence falls into the tail of a given random variable, we can “summarise
away” the relevant part of the sequence, and include caveats when necessary. For instance, a sequence with 90
heads might be described as “all heads except 50 and 71.”
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5

Warranted surprise as alternative explanation

In this chapter I’ll be undertaking two tasks. In the first section, I will propose and defend a
criterion for warranted surprise. In the second section, I will argue that this condition is met, in
the coin-flipping case, by patterned sequences. As far as the first task goes, here’s the basic idea:
when we encounter a surprising sequence, what we’re evaluating is the likelihood that this
sequence was produced by 92 fair coin flips, rather than some other process. And under
reasonable assumptions concerning the prior probability that the process was fair, an
observation of 92 heads makes us almost certain that the process was not, in fact, fair.

5.1

The hypothesis and how it works

The central idea we’ll be pursuing in this section is nicely captured by Roger White:
The crucial feature of surprising events seems to be that they challenge our assumptions
about the circumstances in which they occurred. If at first we assume that the monkey is
typing randomly, then her typing “nie348n sio 9q” does nothing to challenge this
assumption. But when she types “I want a banana” we suspect that this was more than
an accident. The difference is that in the second case there is some alternative but not
wildly improbable hypothesis concerning the conditions in which the event took place,
upon which it is much more probable. (White 2000, 270)19
We will use the case of 92 heads as an illustration. We’ll have to wait until the next section to
argue that, when 92 heads show up, there indeed exists some “alternative but not wildly
improbable hypothesis” which substantially increases the probability of 92 heads. For now, let

19

You may be surprised to learn that I pieced together this account before learning of the prior existence of a similar
theory. If you were, the theory itself might explain why: I might have come across White’s paper or something
similar first, but somehow I didn’t. (Thanks to Kevin Dorst for bringing it to my attention.)
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us assume that this is the case. Then we can show why surprise would be warranted in such a
case by the following Bayesian argument.20
Consider two alternative explanations for an outcome of 92 heads, at the highest level of
generality; one, that we’re faced with a sequence of 92 fair coin flips — call this hypothesis “fair”;
two, that we aren’t so faced — call that “unfair.” Then, given 92 heads (“92”), what’s the
probability that we’re faced with 92 fair coin flips? By Bayes’ theorem,21
P(fair | 92) =

P(fair) P(92 | fair)
.
P(fair) P(92 | fair) + P(unfair) P(92 | unfair)

Now, we have assumed throughout that we are confident, and perhaps even know, that the
process is fair. As I see it, the right way to quantify that confidence is by assigning P(fair) a high
prior probability, but that prior probability should not equal 1. Even if we took ourselves to know
that the process were fair, I take it, we should admit some remote possibility that we might be
wrong. So let’s estimate the prior probability of “unfair” at, say, 1 in 1 billion, or 10-9 . (Again, this
value is primarily chosen for convenience here — in the next section, we’ll tackle the problem of
determining priors in a more principled way.) Let’s also suppose, for now at least, that on the
unfair scenario, each coin has (say) a 99 percent chance of landing heads, instead of a 50 percent
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I owe the idea of applying Bayes’ theorem here to Nassim Taleb (2020, 53). He employs it to argue that if you take
some data to be modeled by a normal distribution, and you observe a “large deviation,” you probably have the
wrong distribution. The binomial distribution on a large sample space approximates the normal distribution, and so
the argument carries over quite easily. Roger White, on the other hand, derives his argument in the quoted passage
from Paul Horwich, who proposes a similar Bayesian account of surprise to that we’re pursuing here.
21
Here’s a brief explanation for the reader who might find it helpful. We’re assuming 92 heads could have come up
in two ways: through 92 fair coin flips (“fair”), or otherwise (“unfair”). We want to know the probability that we’re
in the “fair” scenario, given that we have 92 heads. This is denoted P(fair | 92), which reads “the probability of ‘fair,’
given 92.” The probability of being in the fair situation and having 92 heads come up is just the probability of being
in the fair situation, times the probability that the fair situation yields 92 heads: i.e. P(fair) multiplied by P(92 | fair).
Similarly, the probability of being in the unfair situation and having 92 heads come up is given by P (unfair)
multiplied by P (92 | unfair). When you add up these two probabilities, you get the probability of having 92 heads
come up by one or the other situation. And so, to estimate the probability that the situation was fair, given that we
have 92 heads, we divide the probability of 92 heads and a fair situation by the probability of 92 heads and either a
fair or unfair situation, i.e. the probability of 92 heads, however it came up.

18

chance; this yields a value of about 0.397 for P(92 | unfair). (We’ll revisit these assumptions
presently.)22 And recall: the probability of obtaining all heads, given the fair coin hypothesis, is 1
in 292, or about 2 in 1028. (I’m using powers of ten and approximations below for visual ease, but
I’ll carry out the actual calculation with the precise figures.) Then plugging in the numbers yields,
to two decimal places:
P(fair | 92) =

(1-10-9 )(2×10-28 )
= 5.09×10-19 .
(1-10-9 )(2×10-28 )+ 10-9 (0.397)

There isn’t even a question – the fair coin flip hypothesis is out the window!
Now let’s try some numbers more favourable to the fair coin flip hypothesis. Crank the
prior probability that there’s something weird going on down to 1 in 1 trillion, and suppose —
why not? — that our “unfair” scenario is such that that each individual coin lands heads with
probability a mere 0.7, so that the likelihood of 92 heads, conditional on “unfair,” dwindles to a
tame 6 in 1015:
(1-10-12 )(2×10-28 )
P(fair | 92) =
= 0.03.
(1-10-12 )(2×10-28 )+ 10-12 (6×10-15 )
Closer, but still not close.
In fact, conditional on obtaining 92 heads, in order for the probability of “fair” to reach 0.5
— in order for it to be, pardon the pun, a “toss-up” whether or not we’re dealing with 92 fair coin
flips — the joint probability of an unfair situation and 92 heads would itself have to be of the
order 10-28. If it is substantially higher, the conditional probability of a fair situation, given 92
heads, is going to be very low. A surprising outcome such as 92 heads will take the agent from

22

Incidentally, this is one place where a detail of our puzzle — that it involves 92 coins being flipped once each,
instead of one coin 92 times — becomes relevant. The likelihood that one coin is biased so as to land heads with a
given probability is a priori much higher than the likelihood that 92 coins are biased in such a way.
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practical certainty that the process was fair (i.e., P(fair) very near 1) to practical certainty that it
was unfair (i.e., P(fair | 92) very near zero). What the agent had reason to believe was almost
certainly true, she now has reason to believe is almost certainly false. And this is what warrants
her surprise. But now it is time to take a closer look at how the probabilities in question are
determined, so as to justify our claim that 92 heads is indeed a surprising outcome.

5.2

Determining probabilities

Recall White’s suggestion in the previous section regarding the conditions for surprise: there
must be “some alternative but not wildly improbable hypothesis concerning the conditions in
which the event took place, upon which it is much more probable.” In the previous section, we
used two examples to illustrate how the existence of such a hypothesis might justify surprise:
when the event in question occurs, our credence in whatever circumstances we took to obtain
goes from very near 1 to very near zero. Note, however: White does not give an account of when
such an “alternative, but not wildly improbable” hypothesis exists, either for his typewriter case
or more generally. All he says is that we are surprised in cases which involve such a hypothesis.
Our task is to supplement White’s account with some method for determining when such an
alternative hypothesis exists — in particular, we must figure out what counts as a “wildly
improbable” hypothesis in the first place, and how to tell which alternative hypotheses are wildly
improbable and which are not.
My suggestion, at least in the coin-flipping case, is that such a hypothesis exists when
there is pattern in a sequence. My argument for this proposal is essentially an appeal to
Ockham’s razor. Descriptions of a sequence can be associated with possible explanations of the
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sequence, or possible hypotheses for the process that generated the sequence. The more highly
patterned the sequence, the shorter the minimum possible description length; the simpler the
corresponding explanation or hypothesis; and, by Ockham’s razor, the higher the prior
probability we should assign to it. Like the notion of minimum description length, this general
line of argument has its origins in a branch of algorithmic information theory, specifically in the
field of algorithmic probability pioneered by R. J. Solomonoff (see for instance Li and Vitányi
2019, chapter 5). However, because many of the details of the formal theory depend on
assumptions which do not necessarily transfer directly to physical situations such as the coinflipping case, the argument here will proceed at a much higher level of generality. I now lay out
the argument in more detail with some examples.
As we have already seen, we can describe the 92-head sequence briefly: say, via the
expression “‘H’*92”. Now we might associate such a description with a computer program which
outputs the given sequence. For instance, consider a program which produces the 92-head
sequence as follows: it starts by printing “H”; at each subsequent step, it prints another “H,” and
it stops after printing 92 symbols. The point is that, to describe such a program, we do not need
to specify the entire sequence to the computer, or to give explicit instructions about which
symbol to produce at, say, step 46. Analogously, in thinking of a concrete situation which would
yield 92 heads in a row, we don’t need a different explanation for the outcome of each coin flip;
we may simply posit that the coin-tossing technique or mechanism is such as to cause the coin
to land the same face on each flip. Then we would need only to determine the desired face
(heads) and the desired number of flips (92), and such a process would yield a sequence of 92
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heads as output. Thus, we can use the description “‘H’*92” as shorthand for the suggestion that
the 92-head sequence was produced by such a process.
Here is another example. We might specify the sequence HTHTHTHT… by the
abbreviated description “‘HT’*46.” What sort of process might this correspond to? Again,
thinking of the question in terms of a computer program might be illustrative. Such a process
would start with an “H”; would print a “T” if the previous symbol was an “H,”; and then would
repeat this process 46 times. Again, instead of specifying each individual flip, we only need to
specify two such flips to be repeated a given number of times.
We notice the following parallel: both of the above sequences have short descriptions,
and the processes which might generate those sequences are accordingly simple. Now, by
contrast, let us stipulate a Kolmogorov random sequence beginning HTTTHHTHTHTT…, say,
which cannot be described efficiently short of spelling it out. What sort of process would yield
such a sequence? Unlike the above examples, there is no simple rule (“always land the same
way,” “always alternate,” “repeat a particular sequence however many times,” etc.) which would
yield this sequence. Any process which yielded this sequence would have to be at least as
complex as the sequence itself, in the following sense: if we were to write a computer program
to output such a sequence, we would, at the very least, have to specify the outcome of each
individual coin flip. (We could, of course, come up with a very complex formula which yielded
the given sequence, but such a formula would be more complicated than the sequence itself.)
The above proposal for moving from description length to the characterisation of a
process is schematic, but will do for now. But how do we get from that to determining a prior?
We are guided by two principles here. First, as suggested above, the length of a description
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corresponds to the complexity of the associated process. Second, the length of a given
description is inversely related to the prior probability we assign to the given process. Consider,
for instance, our random sequence beginning HTTTHHTHTHTT…, which (by stipulation) has no
description shorter than the length of the sequence itself, i.e. 92. Suppose that we think it was
produced by some non-random process. As we suggested above, such a process would require
at least as much complexity to describe as the sequence itself. As such, we shouldn’t give this
alternative hypothesis a prior probability of more than 2-92, or 1 divided by the total number of
sequences, because there’s no reason to assign a higher prior probability to the idea that the
process was configured to produce this particular random sequence versus any other. In fact, the
prior probability we assign it will end up being significantly less than 2-92, or else there will not be
“enough probability to go around” for all the conceivable hypotheses explaining the outcome. If
we write “AH” for the alternative hypothesis, then, the product P(AH) P(92 | AH) will be at least
an order of magnitude less than 10-28, and so this alternative hypothesis will fail to disconfirm
“fair” by an appreciable amount, giving the result that our non-patterned sequence is not
surprising.23
We may rephrase the suggestion in the previous paragraph as follows. Write S(n) for the
total number of sequences which admit a description of length n. We are taking description
length as a measure of simplicity, and given equally simple processes, we have no reason (in
general) to consider one of them more likely a priori than another. Thus, given a description of
length n for a given sequence, the prior probability we assign the associated process should be
at most 1 in S(n). But most sequences admit descriptions of many lengths. If we wanted to set
23

I’m expanding here on (very brief) remarks made by Paul Horwich (1982, 103), from whom White draws (with
slight modification) his theory of surprise.
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the prior probabilities in a canonical way for any sequence, the natural thing to do would be to
select the minimum description length, i.e. the Kolmogorov complexity. Note that the number
of sequences with Kolmogorov complexity n would then be at most the number of possible
descriptions in the language of length n, and so this approach would have us well on our way to
finding a value for S(n), and therefore to finding a prior for a given process.
However, at least two problems arise at this point. First of all, descriptions of a sequence,
and thus description lengths, are relative to a choice of language. It can be proven that, under
reasonable constraints on the language in which strings and their descriptions are specified, the
Kolmogorov complexity of a string is invariant under choice of language up to at most an
additive constant independent of the length of the string.24 But the constant in question will
typically tend to be quite large, and so it will only provide a useful constraint on the complexity
of very long strings; that is, the Kolmogorov complexity of a string is only invariant
asymptotically. Even worse, Kolmogorov complexity turns out to be uncomputable in general: it
is impossible to define a simple function that, when given a string, outputs its Kolmogorov
complexity (even within a fixed language).25
These problems pose a challenge for using Kolmogorov complexity as the foundation for
a general theory of surprise, and we will return to them in the conclusion. However, as far as our
coin-flipping puzzle goes, we can afford to be relatively informal, and not worry about the
precise numbers too much. This is because their relative orders of magnitude are more
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For this result, called the invariance theorem, see Li and Vitányi (2019), section 2.1.
For the result that the Kolmogorov complexity is uncomputable, see Grünwald and Vitányi (2008), section 4.3, or
theorem 2.3.2 in Li and Vitányi (2019, 127).
25
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important to establish the point. The central idea is as follows. We begin with the following
assumptions:
(1) The agent is initially highly confident that the process is fair. Thus P(unfair), the agent’s
prior probability that the process is unfair, is very low. However, it is multiple orders of
magnitude higher than 10-28.
(2) The probability of 92 heads if the process is unfair, P(92 | unfair), is also multiple orders
of magnitude higher than 10-28. In particular, both P(unfair) and P(92 | unfair) should have
high enough probability that their product, P(unfair) P(92 | unfair), is at least an order of
magnitude higher than 10-28.
As we saw at the beginning of this section, establishing these prior probabilities with high
precision is a difficult affair. However, given that a sequence of 92 heads is about as simple a
sequence of coin flips as one could hope for, the heuristic argument for assigning higher priors
to simpler processes was meant to show that we can reasonably take assumptions (1) and (2) on
board. And given these assumptions, the Bayesian calculation yields a significant drop in
probability from P(fair) to P(fair | 92), which justifies our surprise at an outcome of 92 heads.
Note that these assumptions are compatible with both P(unfair) and P(92 | unfair) being
very low, as we saw in the example computations in section 5.1 above. In the second
computation, for instance, P(unfair) was of the order 10-12 while P(92 | unfair) was of the order
10-15. Consequently, the probability of 92 heads (from either a fair or unfair process) was of the
order 10-27, while the joint probability of 92 heads and a fair process was of order 10-28 (or about
one-tenth as likely), resulting in a value of P(fair | 92) of order between 1 in 10 and 1 in 100.
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With a few tweaks, we can extend this analysis to other highly patterned sequences as
well, to explain why they are surprising. In those cases, the alternative hypotheses that present
themselves will be somewhat different. (For instance, if a series of coin flips spells out the bits of
, the alternative hypothesis that presents itself will not be that the process is biased towards
heads, but rather that the process involves some computation of .)
To reiterate: what our surprise at patterns tracks, I’m claiming, isn’t quite the likelihood
of one versus another outcome of a given process, but rather the likelihood that one versus
another process yielded a given outcome.26 Our psychological unwillingness to suppose that
patterns might have arisen by chance is misleading if it leads us to say they cannot so arise, but
it correctly indicates that they are overwhelmingly unlikely so to have arisen, rather than by
some other process. Apparently, in this instance at least, we’re intuitive Bayesians! 27
Smith has largely been taking the generating process as given, whereas I’ve just argued
that, faced with a sequence of 92 heads in particular, but any highly regular sequence in
general — regular in the sense discussed in the previous section — we should suspend and
investigate our initial assumptions about the process that generated the sequence. Now, Smith
does say that we should investigate in this way, but he doesn’t seem to think it means we should
be surprised. Here’s what he says:
Having observed a run of 92 heads in a row, one should regard it as very likely that the
coins are double-headed or weighted. But, once these realistic possibilities have been
26

Our surprise does (partly) track the likelihood of a given outcome from a given process. In order for another
process to plausibly have generated the outcome of 92 heads, the outcome had to be unlikely relative to the
assumption that the process is unbiased.
27
Incidentally, this shift in perspective — from holding constant a generating process and considering the possibility
of various outcomes, to holding constant an outcome and considering the possibility of various generating
processes — mirrors a formal duality between the “traditional” (and more familiar) information theory pioneered
by Claude Shannon, on the one hand, and AIT, on the other. For discussion see Grünwald and Vitányi (2008), section
5, and Cover and Thomas (1991), chapter 7.
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ruled out, and we know they don’t obtain, any remaining urge to find some explanation
(no matter how farfetched) becomes self-defeating. (p. 7)
Smith does not explain why he thinks we should consider an alternative hypothesis “very likely,”
but one can reasonably assume he has something like the above Bayesian analysis in mind.
What’s interesting, though, is that he defends the claim that 92 heads shouldn’t surprise us by
arguing that there needn’t be an explanation. And this is where my disagreement with him on
the relationship of surprise to inquiry becomes salient. Shortly after the above passage Smith
states that “it’s rational to be surprised by an event if and only if that event requires investigation
and explanation” (p.7). He agrees that an occurrence of 92 heads requires investigation, but he
does not think it ultimately requires explanation. It may turn out simply to have happened by
chance. As such, he thinks, it does not warrant surprise.
But I find this conclusion puzzling. I agree that there’s nothing surprising about the
outcome anymore, once we’ve investigated and concluded either that it had an explanation or
that it happened by chance. But I see no reason why that should render our initial surprise
unwarranted. Even if we initially knew that the process was fair, we lost that knowledge precisely
in virtue of having observed 92 heads, and only regained it after investigation. And that perfectly
well warrants our surprise. I agree with Smith’s claim that “part of the purpose of surprise is to
spur us into action” (6); that is, to cause us to seek an explanation, to investigate. But I disagree
with his inference that our surprise is only warranted if there must be an explanation to be found.
What makes our surprise warranted is rather the suspicion that there may be a simple
explanation to be found.

27

6 Final considerations
My aim in this final chapter is to touch briefly on two things. In particular, I want to highlight
some questions which we left unaddressed surrounding our initial puzzle, and to consider the
prospects for extending our framework beyond our coin-flipping case, and ultimately towards a
more general theory of surprise.

6.1

Additional questions surrounding our puzzle

In what follows I’ll consider one assumption of our earlier treatment, and one question for further
investigation. First, the assumption: we took it for granted that there was only one competing
hypothesis in the vicinity (namely, that the coin-flipping process was biased towards heads). In
principle, one wants to say, the coin-flipping process might have been unfair in all sorts of ways:
it might have been biased towards heads (with any range of biases), biased towards tails,
engineered in such a way as to alternate faces on each turn, or whatever. In principle, we would
have to include all of these priors in the Bayesian calculation. But as it happens, the simplification
does not affect the argument too much, for two reasons.
(1) The hypothesis that the process is biased towards heads is about as simple an alternative
hypothesis as one could possibly hope for. As such, whatever prior probability we assign
to other alternative hypotheses will, at best, be as negligible as the prior probability that
the process is biased towards heads. Moreover, most of these already unlikely
alternatives are also incredibly unlikely to produce an outcome of 92 heads. For instance,
if “unfair*” is the hypothesis that each flip has a 99 percent chance of landing tails, then
P (92 | unfair*) = (0.01)-92, or 10-184. In short, any alternative hypotheses will themselves
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be so unlikely, or so unlikely to produce 92 heads, or both, that they will not affect the
results of the calculation appreciably.
(2) In any case, it’s dubious that we do, or even could, compute anything like precise
probabilities in our judgments of surprise, whether consciously or unconsciously. Even if
we did, for argument’s sake, the precise probabilities in question would vary depending
on which surprising sequence appeared, among other factors.28 A more realistic
approach to the reassessment of probabilities that takes place in an instance of 92 heads
is that it is retrospective: only after observing a highly patterned outcome would the
agent admit a (remote) prior probability that the process might have been unfair, and
then compute the posterior probability.
That is to say, although it is useful to consider the “prior” probability of an alternative hypothesis,
a more comprehensive treatment would have to determine to what extent this model accurately
captures the actual cognitive process of surprise in real agents, and how useful the model is in
light of this degree of accuracy or lack thereof.
Now consider the following modification of our puzzle. Before the coins are flipped, a
sealed envelope is placed on a table containing a Kolmogorov random sequence, that is, a
sequence which cannot be significantly compressed. The coins are then flipped, and the
resulting sequence is noted. Then the envelope is opened and the sequence just written down is
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To mention just one other factor: consider an outcome in which, say, 90 out of 92 flips land heads. For the
purposes of carrying out a Bayesian computation, we might classify this outcome as an instance of the event (i.e.
collection of outcomes) “90 heads.” However, since an agent in such a situation would also be surprised, and would
have similar suspicions about the nature of the process, had 89 coins landed heads, or 91, or some other very high
number, we might also classify it under the event “85 or more heads,” or “between 89 and 91 heads,” or something.
This would present a significant complication for my argument if our actual surprise depended for its warrant on
the precise outcome of a Bayesian calculation. But I don’t think it does — the constraints are far more permissive,
depending only on relative orders of magnitude.
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compared with the contents of our envelope. They turn out to be a perfect match. We have a
problem: according to our theory, patterned sequences are surprising, and algorithmically
random sequences are not. But here, we have a surprising occurrence of a random sequence!
Similarly, consider the case we had at the end of section 3.3: the sample space is divided into
some large class of outcomes C and its complement. We went along with the suggestion that a
sequence should not be considered surprising simply depending on whether or not it lies in C,
since C might be an arbitrarily gerrymandered set which illuminates nothing about the actual
features (physical, agential or otherwise) of the concrete coin-flipping process. However, in light
of our envelope case, that might have been too hasty. For, if C is large enough and its
complement small enough, it seems as though there could be genuine grounds for surprise if
sequences outside C consistently showed up, regardless of their intrinsic randomness or pattern.
Perhaps (depending on the details of how C is chosen), there might be some hidden reason why
a disproportionately small class of outcomes keeps showing up.
What should we make of such cases? One way of approaching them (although there
might be others) might be to consider the notion of conditional Kolmogorov complexity, which is
(roughly) the shortest input necessary to add to an already given input to yield a specified
output. So, although the sequence is Kolmogorov random, it has low complexity conditional on
the sequence written in the envelope (to which it is identical). In our initial case, no such
mechanism was remotely salient, and so there was no reason to condition on any sequence or
set of sequences. But the notion of conditional complexity may be useful for instances where
non-random mechanisms are already salient beforehand.
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6.2

Extending the framework

What might be involved in extending the framework we have explored to a more general theory
of surprise? Our discussion concludes with two suggestions.
First, such a general theory would have to be applicable to a wide range of real-world
processes. Coin flips are easily considered as binary strings; however, more complex processes
would presumably need to be described in higher-level languages, or might even resist being
translated fully into algorithmic terms. Despite the use we have found for such terms in
considering our puzzle, it is less clear how these more complex processes might be treated in
terms of algorithmic complexity. Second, a general theory would need to be more precise about
the probabilistic terms we used in explaining when surprise is warranted. For instance, when a
surprising event occurs, what precise prior (or range of priors) should be assigned to the
circumstances assumed to obtain by default, the event in question, or the alternative
explanation? What does it mean for such an event to be “much more probable” given the
alternative explanation, or for the alternative explanation to be “not wildly improbable”? Might
answers to each of these questions change depending on answers to the others? We did not fully
work out these details, but they would be relevant for broadening the scope of the theory.
Although these questions are yet to be answered, the aim of this thesis has been to
suggest how the notions of algorithmic information and probability that gave rise to them might
usefully address at least one philosophical question about surprise, and perhaps a greater range
of questions besides.29
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